Technology is where European strategic weakness is least visible and most consequential. The Neo Institute Europa tracks how cyber operations, digital dependence and emerging technologies reshape European power — who targets Europe, through what means, and where the Union’s response falls short. This page collects that work.

How does Russia use cyber operations against Europe?

Russian cyber activity in Europe is best understood as grey-zone statecraft: sustained pressure held deliberately below the threshold of open conflict. Operations are executed through a layered ecosystem of intelligence services — GRU, FSB and SVR — alongside proxy and contractor groups, which preserves plausible deniability and complicates attribution.

The methods rely less on technical novelty than on persistence and timing: spear-phishing and credential theft for initial access, long-term intelligence collection once inside, supply chain compromise to reach further networks, and selective leaking to shape narratives. SolarWinds, NotPetya and MacronLeaks illustrate the range. The cumulative effect is not decisive damage but eroded institutional trust and a rising defensive burden, in an asymmetry where low-cost attacks force sustained European expenditure.

Read: Inside the Grey Zone: Russia’s Cyber Operations in Europe

What is China’s cyber footprint in Europe?

Where Russian activity is disruptive and often visible, Chinese cyber activity in Europe is quieter and more infrastructural, running through espionage, critical infrastructure access and supply chain positioning. Our analysis sets out what it targets and what genuine EU digital sovereignty would require in response.

Read: The Silent Infiltration: China’s Cyber Footprint in Europe

Where does Europe stand in the quantum race?

Europe leads the world in quantum scientific publication and loses ground at commercialisation — the recurring European pattern of strong early-stage research that migrates elsewhere when funding and scale arrive. The EU Quantum Strategy and EuroHPC Joint Undertaking are attempts to close that gap, with the first European quantum computers inaugurated in Poznań and Ostrava. Our analysis argues Europe’s realistic route is to convert its research advantage through demand-side policy, mobility and skills, and partnerships such as EU–Japan cooperation, rather than to out-spend the US or China.

Read: Europe’s Place in the Multipolar Quantum Order

Can Europe build its own defence technology?

Defence technology is where digital policy and security policy meet. Our work examines how far Europe’s ambition of technological self-reliance survives contact with its actual supplier dependencies, and what dual-use and critical-technology policy would need to look like to change that.

Read: Strategic autonomy or strategic illusion? and Beyond Two Dimensions: Europe’s Geopolitical Future in Outer Space

All technology and cyber analysis

Browse the full Technology, Cyber & Digital Policy archive or the related Security & Defence archive.

The Neo Institute Europa is a Luxembourg-registered non-profit (ASBL no. F15340) publishing analysis by early-career researchers across Europe. See Contact to collaborate or contribute.