Neo Institute Europa

Geographic map of Balkan Peninsula / Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License / Free for use / Wikimedia Commons

The EU-Western Balkans summit in Tivat on 5 June 2026 marked a crucial moment for the expansion process of the European Union. Following the meeting, the European Council welcomed the “new impetus” and scheduled a strategic discussion for October 2026 to prepare the Union to function with more than twenty-seven members. At the same time, a Franco-German “non-paper” presented by Merz and Macron proposed a new model of gradual integration, which despite being principally designed for Ukraine and Moldova, reflects a growing awareness that Europe’s eastern border, and therefore the Western Balkans as well, has become an arena for global competition. This will ultimately test the EU’s ability to act as an international player.

Geographical Imperatives

The Western Balkans are geographically fragmented and strategically exposed. The Dinaric Alps divide the region into a patchwork of micro-regions, fueling local rivalries and ethnic divisions that hinder travel, fragment economies and split communication routes. Between the Dinaric Alps and the Carpathians lies the Pannonian Plain, the region’s only open landscape, which connects Central Europe to the lower Danube and positions Serbia as the geopolitical pivot of the peninsula.

The region’s ethnic and religious diversity makes external interference easy. By isolating populations, the mountains have encouraged localism and prevented the formation of unified nation-states, making borders highly unstable and prone to crises. For the European Union, stabilising the Balkans means sealing its own natural fault lines by creating the relational and infrastructural bridges which geography has denied.

Geographical Imperatives

The Tivat summit showed a renewed political commitment. The June 2026 European Council reaffirmed that expansion remains a merit-based and reversible process, but also crucially acknowledged the need to move faster. In that direction, the Franco-German “non-paper” aims to inject “new dynamism” into the accession process by proposing a series of “building blocks” that offer tangible benefits before formal membership: Access to the single market in key sectors like energy and transport, political participation as observers and security cooperation for countries that align with the EU’s common foreign policy. The “EEA-plus” model would represent the most advanced stage of this gradual integration by allowing countries that have adopted the full EU framework in the first five clusters to enjoy the economic benefits of the Union before becoming full members. To date, however, none of the candidate countries meet the criteria needed to access it.

Geopolitical Competition

The EU, however, faces strong competition in the Western Balkans:

The USA pursues a sort of “business diplomacy”. Just recently the Sazan and Zvërnec tourism project in Albania, promoted by Jared Kushner’s Affinity Partners and funded by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, pushed the Albanian government to change its laws on protected areas, sparking fierce political protests. The strategic game is even more complex in Bosnia, where the Trump administration, aligning with Moscow’s policy in the region, recently obtained the resignation of Christian Schmidt, the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while removing sanctions on the Bosnian Serb secessionist leader Milorad Dodik.

Russia acts as a spoiler presence. It maintains control over oil infrastructure, owning the majority of the region’s three refineries in Serbia and Bosnia, as well as the TurkStream pipeline. It uses its soft power operating through the Orthodox Church in Serbia, Montenegro and Republika Srpska, while consistently pursuing hybrid threats like disinformation and support for local nationalist movements.

China represents an actual systemic challenge for Europe in the region. Its investments come without formal political conditions, offering an alternative to the slow-moving European integration, and are concentrated in delicate areas, such as the Republika Srpska, gaining the favour of the local population. Crucially, China also controls the Port of Piraeus, which allows it to reshape the economic flows running towards Central Europe. Diplomatically, its strategic alignment with Russia keeps showing through their joint actions at the UN Security Council regarding Bosnia.

Turkey views the Balkans as an Ottoman legacy. It exerts influence through religious ties with Muslim minorities and its role as an energy corridor for Russian gas via TurkStream.

Israel, a recent addition to the power struggle in the Balkans, seeks to break its international isolation by strengthening ties with countries like Albania and Serbia, viewing them as a way to fracture European consensus on the Palestinian issue. For instance, Serbia has sent over twenty-five million dollars worth of weapons to Israel since the start of the conflict in Gaza, and uses Israeli intelligence software.

The Integration Speed Dilemma

The risks of accelerating the integration process in order to seal the fault lines are significant. Countries like Serbia, which does not recognise Kosovo and maintains strong ties with Russia and China, would gain veto power over key decisions once they become members: Serbia could therefore block sanctions on Russia in the same way that Bosnia could stop initiatives that threaten Chinese interests in Republika Srpska.

Also, if the EU accepts countries that do not respect the Copenhagen criteria, the merit-based principle would collapse and the EU would essentially import frozen conflicts. Additionally, cohesion funds would have to be redistributed to countries with a much lower GDP per capita, creating resentment amongst net-positive taxpayer nations.

On the other hand, the risks of stalling are equally unsettling. Every year of delay is a year when China and Russia build infrastructure, sign agreements and create dependencies. Plus, strategic ambiguity encourages hedging. Serbia and other countries will continue to play multiple sides, receiving EU funds while maintaining ties with Russia and China. The EU could be indirectly funding its own competition.

Furthermore, issues like the protests in Albania, the political deadlock in North Macedonia, or the power vacuum in Bosnia are problems that will not resolve themselves. The lack of a clear timeline can fuel public discontent and nationalism.

The Lesson of 1878 and Today’s “Accelerated but Conditional” Integration

On this matter, the 1878 Congress of Berlin offers a valuable warning. Back then, the European great powers tried to stabilise the Balkans by redrawing borders to suit their own strategic interests. The decisions were made by outside powers, without involving local populations and without addressing the root causes of instability. The result was a fragile balance that, instead of bringing peace, fueled new resentments and contributed to the outbreak of the First World War.

As fast and short-sighted EU expansion for purely geopolitical reasons, as tactically understandable, risks repeating the same strategic mistake. The integration process could become yet another external design of power balance that ignores the deep cause of instability and simply moves the problems inside the European Union.

The choice is not between rushing and waiting, but between a superficial intervention and a strategic one. The EU must act urgently, but it must do so through a gradual integration that offers real short-term benefits (access to the single market, funds) while maintaining strict conditions (reforms, rule of law, alignment with foreign policy).

The Structural Dilemma: Reforming the EU to Become a Global Power

This “middle way” for the Western Balkans is probably the most realistic solution in the short term. But it would be short-sighted not to recognise that it is just a temporary fix.

The European Parliament has already asked to expand qualified majority voting in foreign policy and to reform Article 7 of the EU Treaty to make sanctions against rule-of-law violations more effective. These reforms would allow the EU to integrate difficult countries without the risk of decision-making paralysis or importing frozen conflicts. However, these changes require unanimity to pass, the exact same principle that currently paralyses expansion and foreign policy. Paradoxically, to eliminate the veto, everyone must agree to give up their veto, and the countries expected to vote it away are the very ones benefiting from the status quo today.

A Window Not Open Forever

The geography of Europe’s eastern borders provokes the EU with the integration dilemma. The Tivat summit and the Franco-German “non-paper” certainly mark a change in pace, but the competition is far from over. The EU must expand wisely: Integrate gradually, enforce strict conditions and act with strategic urgency. It must also consider past historical errors: A bad intervention is worse than no intervention at all, but failing to act when the region is contested by hostile powers is just as dangerous. Yet, gradual integration remains a temporary fix. The real question is whether the EU truly wants to become a global power or it prefers to remain a free-trade area with international ambitions. The answer to this question will determine if, and when, the necessary reforms will happen. Until then, the Union must navigate between strategic urgency and institutional limits, knowing that the window of opportunity in the Western Balkans is open, but not forever.