Neo Institute Europa

Laser Towards Milky Ways Centre (September 2010). © European Southern Observatory (ESO) / Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License / Free for use / Wikimedia Commons

Geopolitics is back on the table, and the European Union (EU) is called to face what could be a defining transition for its survival: becoming the first international organisation to act as a geopolitical subject. In addition to this already demanding challenge, the EU must consider that the current geopolitical chessboard is not bidimensional: it is not limited to the geo-political aspect of defence policy, but develops along the z-axis. There cannot be a serious and comprehensive defence strategy without a precise space policy.

Outer space is no longer a neutral frontier. It is a domain with geographical features and boundaries of its own, the Kármán line, Low and Medium Earth Orbits, Geostationary Orbit, and the Lagrange points, all of which are increasingly treated as strategic assets. Satellite constellations crowd low orbits, orbital slots are mapped and claimed, and space is contested in ways reminiscent of naval chokepoints. Anti-satellite tests, cyberattacks on orbital assets, and the militarisation of launch systems confirm that space has become an active geopolitical arena.

Global Competition in Outer Space

The United States (US), Russia, and China dominate space geopolitics, while other actors such as India, Japan, Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are consolidating their presence. Each actor’s space policy reveals a distinct philosophy underneath. The United States views space as vital for global leadership and leverages private industry to extend its dominance. SpaceX’s mega Starlink constellations saturate the Low Earth Orbit, while the Artemis Accords project the geometry of the American earthy sphere of influence over the Moon. Russia treats space primarily as a military theatre, focusing on deterrence by denial through anti-satellite weapons and counter-space technologies. In addition, it joined the influence battle over the Moon with its Luna programme. China’s approach combines denial with long-term dominance. Its lunar programme “Chang’e” aims to establish a lunar base on the Moon’s southern pole, expanding to outer space its challenge to the Western governance model. India, Japan, and other emerging actors such as Brazil and the UAE, despite still working within an exploratory and commercial framework, have also started reorienting their programmes towards a securitarian one.

Is Europe a Space Power?

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine exposed Europe’s vulnerabilities in the multidimensional character of modern conflict. The EU could not provide Ukraine with autonomous communication and surveillance, relying instead on superior US technologies, and doing so highlighted its lack of preparedness and raised the issue of autonomy in space as a strategic imperative.

The EU is no stranger to the outer space environment, as demonstrated by its track record in civilian use. The Copernicus programme has been very important in monitoring climate change and agriculture, coordinating disaster response, and supporting urban planning. Nonetheless, the EU cannot be considered a space power. It falls behind in critical domains such as human spaceflight, military use of space, and space situational awareness. It still depends too much on foreign technologies and its persistent institutional fragmentation undermines Europe’s capacity to act autonomously.

The history of European space policy has not been particularly linear. Its first phase, beginning in 1975 with the creation of the European Space Agency (ESA), was characterised by a focus on peaceful exploration without defence responsibilities. The second phase, in the early 2000s, saw the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and growing recognition of the role of space in security and defence, culminating in the Lisbon Treaty, which granted the EU competence in space. Paradoxically, however, the treaty’s ratification marked the end of serious discussions about a genuine European space policy, leading to a current third phase characterized by a succession of strategies rather than policies.

This distinction is crucial. A space policy would define Europe’s ambitions and clarify its role in outer space, while a strategy outlines the steps to implement a policy. By relying on strategies alone, the EU has remained reactive, adjusting to the initiatives of stronger space powers rather than setting its own direction into outer space, and consequently in the possible future, the stars. The same 2023 EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence (SSSD), despite reinforcing the supranational dimension of space policy by assigning a major role to the European Commission within space strategy, also diluted its geopolitical and defence aspects, merging them with market-oriented priorities. Elaborating a comprehensive policy is therefore understandably difficult when responsibilities remain fragmented among the Commission, the European External Action Service, the Satellite Centre, the EDA, and ESA.

Building Blocks of a European Space Defence

It can be pointed out, however, that the 2023 SSSD and the Strategic Compass of 2022 basically function as a European Space Defence Policy. They indeed represent an important step forward, identifying space as a strategic domain, embedding it within the EU’s broader security framework, and focusing on space-based capabilities and defence-oriented exercises. Space programmes have been more explicitly connected with defence needs, marking a shift from a narrow focus on situational awareness to the broader concept of Space Domain Awareness, which incorporates analysis of intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. In addition to that, concrete initiatives are beginning to emerge.

In December 2024, the Commission signed a concession contract for the IRIS² constellation, a network of 290 satellites in Low and Medium Earth Orbits designed to provide secure connectivity for governmental users, strengthen resilience against hybrid threats, and reinforce Europe’s autonomy in critical infrastructures.
Efforts are also underway to build a sovereign European launch industry, reducing reliance on American providers. Unlike the US, where heavy-lift vehicles dominate, Europe’s private firms are focusing on niche markets, especially small and medium payloads into polar and sun-synchronous orbits.

High-latitude launch sites in Norway and the United Kingdom (UK) give Europe an advantage for these trajectories, as operating from within the continent shortens logistics and accelerates turnaround for customers. Several companies are leading this shift. Germany’s Isar Aerospace launched its Spectrum rocket in March, though unsuccessfully, and continues development. Rocket Factory Augsburg is testing partial reusability, experimenting with parachute recovery at sea. Orbex in the UK and HyImpulse in Germany are advancing their own systems, supported financially and technically by the ESA, which remains a crucial institutional backer, operating Ariane and Vega rockets from French Guiana and funding private ventures through its Boost! programme, the European Launcher Challenge, and the Themis project on reusable technologies.

Yet structural challenges remain. Polar and sun-synchronous orbits are strategically valuable, but a space power cannot prescind from efficient equatorial launches, where Earth’s rotation provides clear advantages. French Guiana offers this option, but high transport costs and logistical delays limit its effectiveness compared to other global players.

Europe’s Geopolitical Future Demands an Astropolitical Vision

In sum, Europe is not yet a space power, and it may have begun its path toward becoming one too late. Between the US leveraging private industry and technological breakthroughs to dominate low Earth orbit and project influence to the Moon, Russia weaponizing space through deterrence and denial, China pursuing asymmetric strategies to counter US superiority while advancing its own lunar ambitions, and emerging powers consolidating their presence with a mix of national security and commercial goals, the EU stands out as an aspiring but incomplete player.

Europe has achieved important civilian successes with programmes such as Copernicus and Galileo, and has taken first steps toward defence relevance through the 2022 Strategic Compass and the 2023 Space Strategy for Security and Defence. In addition, new commercial ventures, backed by ESA funding, are experimenting with innovative launch systems and developing spaceports in Norway and the UK. Yet all these developments do not compensate for fundamental structural weaknesses: geographical disadvantages compared to equatorial launch powers, industrial and technological gaps, dependence on foreign components, and above all, political fragmentation. The war in Ukraine exposed these limits clearly, showing that the EU could not sustain itself in a multidimensional conflict without American space support.

Even now, the Union lacks a comprehensive space policy, offering only a series of strategies that remain reactive and fragmented. This weakness is not unexpected: the EU is only just beginning to act as a geopolitical subject, rethinking its role in a world increasingly defined by great-power rivalry. But precisely because Europe is undergoing this defining transition, it cannot afford to neglect the astropolitical dimension. A geopolitical Europe will remain incomplete if it continues to think only in two dimensions. To secure its future, the Union must integrate the z-axis of defence strategy into its vision, so as to avoid remaining dependent in the very domain where the future of power dynamics is already being decided.